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SUMMARY: This study investigates whether auditor quality and audit committee
expertise are associated with improved financial reporting timeliness as measured by the
duration of a financial statement restatement’s ‘‘dark period.’’ The restatement dark
period represents the length of time between a company’s discovery that it will need to
restate financial data and the subsequent disclosure of the restatement’s effect on
earnings. For a sample of dark restatements disclosed between 2004 and 2009, we find
that companies that engage Big 4 auditors have shorter dark periods than companies
that do not engage Big 4 auditors. We also find that companies with more financial
experts on the audit committee have shorter dark periods, but only when such financial
expertise relates specifically to accounting. Finally, companies with audit committee
chairs that have accounting financial expertise provide the most timely disclosures, as
the dark periods for these firms are reduced by approximately 38 percent. Our results
suggest that both auditor and audit committee expertise are associated with the timely
disclosure of restatement details.
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INTRODUCTION
S
everal recent regulatory actions suggest that the timely reporting of financial data is a top
priority of investors and regulators (SEC 2002, 2004). One such action is the requirement
that firms disclose a pending restatement within four business days of management’s initial
non-reliance judgment (SEC 2004). While a vast majority of firms is in compliance with the
‘‘four-day rule,’’ many of these initial filings fail to provide investors with the quantitative
information needed to properly evaluate the severity of the restatement. In addition, subsequent
filings often are delayed, such that lengthy informational ‘‘dark periods’’ exist between the initial
restatement announcement and the eventual disclosure of quantitative restatement details. In sum,
the delays created by dark periods make it difficult for investors to value companies and also may
result in costly loan defaults or stock delistings for the restating companies themselves (ACIFR
2008). As Greg Jonas, a member of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial
Reporting (ACIFR) and managing director at Moody’s Investors Services, states, ‘‘the dark period
is bad for [financial statement] users’’ (Leone 2008).
In this paper, we use the dark restatement setting to address the fundamental question of
whether better governance helps companies resolve financial reporting problems. Previous research
shows that companies with better governance—as proxied by various characteristics related to
boards of directors and audit committees—are better able to prevent financial reporting problems
such as accounting restatements, financial fraud, and internal control weaknesses (e.g., Beasley
1996; Abbott et al. 2004; Hoitash et al. 2009). Our paper differs in that it examines how better
governance helps companies respond to problems when they do arise. Similar to Goh (2009) who
investigates whether better governance helps firms remediate material weaknesses (MWs) in
internal controls more quickly, we examine whether auditor quality and audit committee (AC)
expertise are associated with more timely remediation of misstatements and the subsequent
provision of restatement details.
We examine auditors and audit committees because these two participants in the governance
process are responsible for financial reporting oversight and should be best equipped to address the
complicated accounting issues that often are associated with restatements.1 Prior research that
examines the association between auditor quality and the timeliness of annual accounting
disclosures finds that clients of Big N auditors have shorter audit reporting lags, measured as the
number of days between a client’s fiscal year-end and the audit report date (Leventis et al. 2005).
However, little is known about the auditor’s involvement in the financial reporting process outside
of the standard year-end audit. In addition, although prior research shows that AC financial
expertise is associated with higher quality financial reporting (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008;
Abbott et al. 2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Carcello et al. 2009), little is known about the AC’s
involvement in the remediation of financial reporting problems.
Our paper is largely an extension of Badertscher and Burks (2011) who investigate disclosure
lags for a broad sample of restatements (a majority of which are not ‘‘dark’’) announced between
1997 and 2005. Badertscher and Burks (2011, 609) conclude that dark restatements result primarily
from a need for investigation into cases of fraud or multiple, longstanding, or large errors and state
that ‘‘long lags appear to be caused by inherent constraints on producing reliable information.’’
Badertscher and Burks (2011) do not document a significant relationship between disclosure lags
and auditor quality nor do they investigate how governance might influence the timely provision of
restatement details. By restricting our analysis to (1) companies with initial restatement disclosures
1 The primary role of the auditor and the audit committee in the oversight process is to provide assurance, ex ante,
that material financial statement misstatements do not occur. However, Francis and Yu (2011) document a
restatement frequency rate of roughly 20 percent among Big 4 clients.
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that do not provide specific quantitative details, and (2) disclosures occurring after the effective date
of the four-day rule, we hope to shed light on the relationships that may exist between auditors, audit
committees, and disclosure timeliness for the subset of restating firms with ‘‘inherent constraints.’’
After controlling for a variety of factors including firm size, auditor changes, the magnitude
and direction of the restatement, and the presence of fraud, we find that Big 4 clients disclose
quantitative restatement details significantly more quickly than non-Big 4 clients do. We also find
that restatement disclosures are timelier when clients have ACs with more financial expertise, but
only when such expertise relates specifically to accounting. Finally, we find that dark periods are
reduced most dramatically (by approximately 38 percent, on average) when the AC chair is an
accounting financial expert. Overall, our results suggest that the expertise of both auditors and audit
committees contributes to the remediation of financial reporting problems by enabling clients to
disclose dark restatement details more quickly.
Our study should be of interest to policymakers, boards of directors, and investors concerned
with corporate governance. Our findings suggest that governance participants contribute to the dark
restatement remediation process and, therefore, are important to the financial reporting process
beyond the review of annual/quarterly financial statements. In addition, while prior research does not
provide evidence that the presence of a Big N auditor is associated with restatement disclosure lags,
our analysis suggests that in cases where companies are unable to provide quantitative restatement
details in initial filings, Big 4 auditors do improve the timeliness of subsequent disclosures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section presents background
information and develops our hypotheses. The third section describes our research design. The fourth
section discusses the sample selection and presents descriptive statistics. The fifth section presents
our multivariate results and additional tests. Concluding remarks are provided in the sixth section.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The Importance of Timely Disclosures
The FASB/IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting defines timeliness as
‘‘having information available to decision makers in time to be capable of influencing their
decisions’’ (FASB 2010). Recently passed legislation indicates that lawmakers and regulators desire
timelier financial reporting. For example, in 2002 the SEC initiated a three-year phase-in period that
shortened mandatory 10-K filing deadlines for large (small) accelerated filers from 90 days to 60
days (75 days).2 Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) also requires that
companies disclose, ‘‘on a rapid and current basis . . . information concerning material changes in
the financial condition or operations of the issuer’’ (U.S. House of Representatives 2002).
In order to implement SOX Section 409, the SEC issued a new rule in 2004 that requires
companies to disclose a forthcoming restatement within four business days following
management’s non-reliance judgment, even if the precise impact of the restatement on the
company’s earnings is not yet known (SEC 2004). One of the intents of the four-day rule was to
provide investors with more timely disclosure about accounting restatements. However, the
requirement to provide timely notification of a need to restate does not necessarily result in timely
disclosure of the restatement’s quantitative impact on earnings. Unfortunately, company
investigations related to restatements can be extensive—lasting several months or even beyond a
year in some cases—and earnings-related regulatory filings often are absent during this time period.
In its 2008 report, the ACIFR stated that there are ‘‘many circumstances [where] investors could
benefit from improvements in the nature and timeliness of disclosure in the [dark] period’’ (ACIFR
2 Non-accelerated filers continue to have 90-day filing deadlines.
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2008, 80). We investigate whether disclosures are timelier in the presence of higher quality auditors
and audit committees.
In a study that is related to ours, Badertscher and Burks (2011; hereafter BB) investigate the
causes and consequences of a number of different types of disclosure lags for restating firms having
data available between 1997 and 2005. They find that in their broad sample of restatements, long
disclosure lags are uncommon and are largely due to board, regulatory, or fraud investigations.
However, BB do not document a significant relationship between disclosure lags and auditor
quality and do not investigate the potential effects of corporate governance. Badertscher and Burks
(2011) ultimately conclude that additional regulation mandating the timely disclosure of
restatement data would not be likely to reduce disclosure lags because the majority of firms with
significant delays seem unable to provide disclosure information on a timely basis. We extend BB
by focusing exclusively on dark restatements and limiting our analysis to restatements that were
announced after the introduction of the four-day rule. Our purpose is to evaluate the subset of
restatement firms for which disclosure problems do exist and to investigate whether disclosure
timeliness is associated with certain characteristics of auditors and audit committees.3
Costs of Delayed Disclosures
Dark periods can impose significant costs on both investors and restating companies. According
to one analyst, ‘‘investors count on restatements to get a true sense of a company’s financial health,
notice trends, and create realistic projections of earnings and cash flows’’ (Johnson 2008). A lengthy
remediation process coupled with minimal regulatory filings and other disclosures may make
investors uncertain as to how to assess future cash flows and thereby accurately value a company. As
a result, stock prices typically decline following restatement announcements, particularly those
restatement announcements that fail to disclose the restatement’s impact on earnings (Leone 2008).
Additional costs exist as well, in that the failure to submit timely financial reports during a dark
period frequently is associated with SEC sanctions, penalties, and suspended stock trading. Thus, it
is in a company’s best interests to disclose remediated data as quickly as possible in order to
minimize the explicit costs of the restatement and to restore investors’ confidence in the firm’s
operations and financial reports. In fact, the timeliness of restatement disclosures may be more
important to investors than the timeliness of 10-Ks, given that the latter often are supplemented with
readily available alternative sources of financial information (e.g., analyst forecasts and earnings
announcements) between the end of a fiscal period and the annual filing date.
Hypotheses
The popular press suggests, ‘‘internal accountants and auditors pore over mistakes’’ during the
dark period to understand and quantify the accounting errors that exist (Johnson 2008). As such, the
length of the dark period is likely to be related to the investigative capabilities and familiarity of
these parties with the client’s underlying accounting systems and processes. An external auditor’s
accounting expertise may also help a client address problems related to restatements more quickly.
At a minimum, such experience and expertise could decrease the time that it takes the audit firm to
become comfortable with and willing to sign off on an estimate of the error that is being corrected.
Prior research finds that Big N auditors are associated with shorter audit reporting lags, measured as
3 Auditor involvement is likely to have increased after 2004 because firms were under no specific regulatory time
pressure to provide restatement announcements or quantitative details before the effective date of the four-day
rule. Audit committee involvement is likely to have increased after 2004 because while SOX AC requirements
were effective in July of 2003, the SEC did not require the stock exchanges to demand compliance until 2004
(large issuers) or 2005 (small/foreign issuers).
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the number of days between a client’s fiscal year-end and the audit report date (Leventis et al.
2005), and greater financial reporting quality in general.4 Large audit firms have greater resources
available to devote to staff training, more extensive ongoing contact with SEC personnel and
registrants, and a greater incentive to resolve problems satisfactorily in order to avoid potential
litigation costs. For all of these reasons, we believe that clients of Big 4 auditors should have shorter
dark periods. Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Restatement dark periods are shorter for clients of Big 4 auditors.
Audit committees are responsible for financial reporting quality and oversight of the financial
reporting process (BRC 1999; U.S. House of Representatives 2002; NYSE 2004). Like the auditor,
the AC is not involved in developing the quantification of errors related to restatements. However,
the AC typically does oversee the investigation, which significantly influences the thoroughness
and integrity of the process.5 The AC also approves the restatement disclosure.
When misstatements occur, both companies and ACs are likely to be motivated to pursue a
prompt resolution for a number of reasons. First, a timely release of the restatement details should
reduce the information asymmetry faced by investors and thereby decrease the company’s cost of
capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Second, similar to the management earnings forecast
literature (Skinner 1994; Field et al. 2005), litigation risk may increase if investors believe that the
company was not forthcoming with its disclosure or that the AC did not promptly address the issue.
Audit committees in particular have recently been criticized in several high-profile business failures
(e.g., Lehman Brothers and AIG) and have been sued in restatement-related cases for failing to
provide effective and timely financial reporting oversight.6 In addition, restatements can impair the
reputation of individual AC members. Prior research finds that AC members serving on boards of
restating companies experience greater turnover than AC members serving on boards of non-
restating companies (Srinivasan 2005). Thus, the increased threat of litigation and potential loss of
directorship may motivate an AC to seek the timely correction of misstatements.
Recent legislation indicates that regulators believe in the value of financial expertise on the AC.
Section 407 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requires disclosure of designated financial experts in an
effort to ‘‘enhance investor confidence in the fairness and integrity’’ of financial reporting (U.S. House
of Representatives 2002). In response, the major stock exchanges included audit committee expertise
as a requirement for listed companies (NYSE 2004; NASDAQ 2009). A growing body of research
shows that the presence of significant financial expertise on ACs improves their financial reporting
oversight. For example, firms with greater AC financial expertise experience greater accounting
conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008), decreased earnings management (Be´dard et al. 2004;
Carcello et al. 2009), fewer restatements (Abbott et al. 2004), and fewer material internal control
weaknesses (Krishnan 2005; Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009). Further, McDaniel et al. (2002)
suggest that AC members with financial expertise are better able to evaluate financial reporting quality
4 Although Lawrence et al. (2011) challenge this assumption, evidence from prior studies indicates that clients of
Big N auditors report more conservative accruals (Becker et al. 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999; and Myers et al.
2003), are less likely to commit fraud (Farber 2005), are more likely to comply with generally accepted
accounting principles (Krishnan and Shauer 2000), and bear a lower cost of capital (Beatty 1989; Khurana and
Raman 2004; Pittman and Fortin 2004; Cassell et al. 2010). In addition, Blokdijk et al. (2006) find that Big N
audit firms allocate audit hours more effectively, resulting in audits that are deemed to be of higher quality.
5 For example, when Dell Corporation announced its need to restate fiscal years 2003–2006, it specifically stated
that its AC performed an independent investigation into its accounting and financial reporting matters and
determined the need for restatement.
6 For example, shareholders of Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products sued its AC after the company restated three
years of revenue. In this case, the judge concluded that ‘‘The audit committee had a duty to oversee the auditors,
that is, to guard the guardians . . . The audit committee was reckless in performing this role until the horse was out
of the barn’’ (Stuart 2004).
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and are more likely to express concern about less prominent, but recurring accounting issues. In our
context, an AC with greater financial expertise may be better able to assist internal accountants and
management as they investigate the accounting problems giving rise to the dark restatement.
Finally, the presence of significant financial expertise on an AC may enable AC members to
allocate their own time and resources more efficiently such that the misstatement is corrected in a timely
fashion. Although firms do not tend to provide specific details about AC activities in their SEC filings,
numerous companies refer to AC involvement in the misstatement investigation and remediation
process.7 Financial experts should be considerably more efficient at interacting with management and
the other parties involved in the restatement process. For all of these reasons, we expect that disclosure
timeliness will be enhanced by the presence of financial experts on the AC. Thus, H2a is as follows:
H2a: Restatement dark periods are shorter when the audit committee contains a larger
proportion of financial experts.
H2b follows directly from H2a, but tightens our definition of financial expertise. A number of
recent studies use financial expertise measures that are more refined than the SOX Section 407
definition. The studies most relevant to our work are Hoitash et al. (2009) and Goh (2009).8 Hoitash
et al. (2009) identify three types of financial experts: accounting financial experts (e.g., CPAs and
CFOs), supervisory financial experts (e.g., CEOs, board chairs), and user financial experts (e.g.,
financial analysts, investment bankers). They find that while the presence of both accounting
financial experts (AFEs) and supervisory financial experts (SFEs) decreases the likelihood of Section
404 MW disclosure, only AFEs are associated with decreased MWs that are account-specific and
only SFEs are associated with decreased MWs that are management oriented. Thus, the reduction in
specific types of MWs is related to the specific expertise of AC members. Goh (2009) adopts a similar
approach in his investigation of the remediation of Section 302 MWs. His analysis shows that while
the general Section 407 ‘‘financial expert’’ designation significantly reduces the time it takes for firms
to remediate their MWs, this association is driven by non-accounting (i.e., supervisory) experts. Goh
(2009) does not test for specific associations between MW categories and different types of financial
experts, so direct comparisons between his work and Hoitash et al. (2009) are difficult. Such
comparisons are further complicated by the fact that Hoitash et al. (2009) note that the AFE and SFE
relationships they document for Section 404 MWs typically do not exist for Section 302 MWs.
We expect that the accounting expertise of AC members should be important in the context of
dark restatement disclosures. Specifically, while the interactions that take place between AC
members and the restating company should be comparable to those that would be associated with
MW remediation—e.g., reviewing procedures with staff, interacting with internal and external
auditors, following up on recommendations, and monitoring progress (Goh 2009)—we believe that
interactions with accounting financial experts will be particularly important in the restatement
setting because all restatements, by definition, involve problems that are specifically related to
accounting.9 Thus, H2b is as follows:
7 For example, following its restatement in 2006, Dell Corporation disclosed in an 8-K that ‘‘The Audit Committee
has directed management to develop a detailed plan and timetable’’ for remediation of its restatement-related
problems and ‘‘will monitor their implementation.’’
8 Other studies also suggest that AC members with professional accounting or auditing experience contribute to AC
effectiveness more so than AC members without similar experience (Knapp 1987; DeZoort and Salterio 2001;
Naiker and Sharma 2009).
9 For example, Jabil Circuit’s May 15, 2007 10-K filing notes that the audit committee, assisted by independent
legal counsel, reviewed historical revenue recognition transactions with two customers and concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to support the recognition of $6 million of revenue in a previous year. In this case, the
committee’s involvement is rather direct, and it would seem that the evaluation of the propriety of revenue
recognition transactions should be more efficient if an AFE is present.
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H2b: Restatement dark periods are shorter when the audit committee contains a larger
proportion of accounting financial experts.
Our final hypothesis involves the audit committee chair (ACC). The ACC, as the ‘‘CEO of the
audit committee’’ (Ernst & Young 2011) and the ‘‘focal point for the committee’s relations with the
board, the CFO, and the internal and external auditors’’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2003), is the
member of the AC that essentially determines its effectiveness (Bromilow 2010). The ACC is the
committee member who has the greatest responsibility for overseeing financial reporting and who
also is more likely than other AC members to be held accountable for financial reporting failures.
For example, Glass, Lewis & Company, a proxy research provider, notes that the ACC will be the
AC member to receive an unfavorable proxy voting recommendation if the AC as a whole lacks
diligence or expertise (Glass, Lewis & Company 2010; emphasis added). As a result, we expect the
ACC to be the AC member most responsible for and influential in a company’s misstatement
remediation efforts. Building from H2b, we expect that AC accounting financial expertise will be
most valuable when it is provided by the ACC. H3 is as follows:
H3: Restatement dark periods are shorter when the audit committee chair has accounting
financial expertise.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In this section, we develop the multivariate model that we use to investigate the determinants of
the length of restatement dark periods. We use a negative binomial regression model because our
dependent variable is a count variable and our data are over dispersed (i.e., the dependent variable
cannot be negative and its mean is greater than its median).10 All of the variables in Equation (1) are
described in Appendix A:
TIMEPASSED ¼ b0 þ b1logðASSETSÞ þ b2ROA þ b3LTDARþ b4FOR SEG þ b5BUS SEG
þ b6OUTSIDEBLK þ b7DIROFFSHR þ b8LENGTH þ b9PROXIMITY
þ b10DURING AUDIT þ b11FRAUDþ b12MULT ISSUES
þ b13RESTEFFECT þ b14POS EARN þ b15AUD SPEC þ b16AUDCHG
þ b17BIG4 þ b18AC EXPERTISE þ e:
ð1Þ
Our dependent variable, TIMEPASSED, measures the length of the dark period. We define
TIMEPASSED as the number of days that pass between the date on which the company states, in
its initial 8-K filing, that it discovered the need for a restatement and the date on which
restatement details are released either in an amended or regularly scheduled 10-Q or 10-K.11 Our
basic financial control measures are log(ASSETS), ROA, and LTDAR, defined as the natural
logarithm of total assets, net income divided by total assets, and long-term debt divided by total
assets, respectively. Although we do not make directional predictions for these variables, we
include them as controls because a firm’s reporting environment is likely to be influenced by its
size, and because firm performance and capital structure may influence disclosure behavior
10 The negative binomial model adds a parameter to the Poisson model that adjusts for heterogeneity.
11 The disclosure lag variables used by BB equal the number of days between the initial restatement announcement
and either the definitive disclosure of the restatement’s earnings impact (TO_NUMBERS), or the filing of restated
financial statements (TO_FILING). Our TIMEPASSED measure is comparable to both of BB’s variables, as all of
our restatement details were revealed in amended or regular 10-Q or 10-K filings. We begin the calculation of
TIMEPASSED with the date that the firm states that it discovered the need for a restatement (rather than the initial
disclosure date, as in BB), but our results are not sensitive to this specification.
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(Myers et al. 2011). We also control for complexity that might not be captured entirely by firm
size by including the number of foreign segments (FOR_SEG) and the number of business
segments (BUS_SEG). We do not make directional predictions for these coefficients for the same
reason that we do not offer a predicted relationship for firm size. Specifically, large firms may be
more complex, but they also may have more resources at their disposal that would allow them to
efficiently address problems that arise.
The next two control variables are governance measures that are related to common stock
ownership. We expect to observe a negative coefficient on both OUTSIDEBLK (the percentage of
shares owned by 5 percent and greater outside blockholders) and DIROFFSHR (the percentage of
shares owned by directors and officers as a group), because financial reporting quality should be
higher in the presence of better shareholder monitoring (e.g., Bamber et al. 1993; Bushee and Noe
2000). We expect a positive coefficient on LENGTH—defined as the length, in years, of the restated
time period—because restatements that involve multiple quarters or years may be more complex
and, hence, may take longer to resolve. For a similar reason, we also expect a positive coefficient on
PROXIMITY, which measures the timespan between the end of the restated time period and the
discovery of a need for restatement. Specifically, we expect that it would be more difficult to
resolve misstatements the more distant they are from the discovery date. In contrast, we expect a
negative coefficient on DURING_AUDIT—a binary variable defining companies with restatements
that were identified within 90 days after fiscal year-end—because auditor involvement in the
restatement likely would be higher during the period in which most of the company’s annual audit
is being conducted.
The final six control variables are FRAUD, MULT_ISSUES, RESTEFFECT, POS_EARN,
AUD_SPEC, and AUDCHG. We use these measures to control for issues related to (1) fraud; (2) the
complexity, severity, and direction of the restatement; and (3) the auditor effects that are not tied to
our hypotheses. FRAUD is set equal to 1 for restatements that identify—according to Audit
Analytics—financial fraud, irregularities, and misrepresentations, or SEC or other regulatory
investigations. As in BB, we expect the coefficient on FRAUD to be positive. MULT_ISSUES is a
binary variable that is set equal to 1 in cases where the restatement involves more than one
accounting rule (GAAP/FASB) application failure. Assuming the existence of multiple accounting
problems is indicative of incremental complexities that would complicate the remediation process,
we expect the coefficient on MULT_ISSUES to be positive. The next variable, RESTEFFECT, is
defined as the decile ranking of the absolute value of the restatement’s cumulative impact on net
income scaled by total assets. Because the remediation process is likely to be more complicated for
restatements that are more material, we expect a positive coefficient on RESTEFFECT. We define
POS_EARN as a binary variable that identifies companies having restatements with adjustments that
ultimately increase earnings. To the extent that increasing earnings provides a disclosure incentive
for firms, the coefficient on POS_EARN should be negative.
Regarding auditor controls, AUD_SPEC identifies companies that have industry specialist
auditors at the discovery date and AUDCHG identifies companies that changed auditors during the
period beginning one year prior to the discovery date and ending with the provision of restatement
details (i.e., the end of the dark period).12 Although we anticipate that the largest auditor-based
influence on the timeliness of dark restatement disclosures should come from the presence of a Big
4 (relative to non-Big 4) auditor, as noted in H1, it is conceivable that industry specialist auditors
may further reduce dark periods. If that is the case, the coefficient for AUD_SPEC should be
negative. In contrast, we expect that sorting out restatement problems will take longer when an
12 We define industry specialists as audit firms having at least 30 percent national market share within a given two-
digit SIC code. As an alternative, we define industry specialists as audit firms that are the national market leaders
within a given two-digit SIC code. Our results are not sensitive to these specifications.
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auditor change exists because new auditors will be less familiar with the restating company and will
therefore need more time, all else equal, to become comfortable with signing off on the restated
figures. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on AUDCHG.
We use the remaining variables to test H1–H3. BIG4 is a binary variable that identifies
companies that are Big 4 audit clients at the time the dark restatement is announced. A negative
coefficient on BIG4 would support our prediction in H1 that clients of Big 4 auditors have shorter
dark periods. The next variable, AC_EXPERTISE, is defined in three different ways, corresponding
to H2a, H2b, and H3. In our test of H2a, we define AC_EXPERTISE as AC_EXP%—the proportion
of financial experts, measured as the number of AC members that are designated as financial experts
under Section 407 of SOX divided by the total number of AC members. If, as predicted by H2a,
greater AC financial expertise is associated with shorter dark periods, then the coefficient on
AC_EXP% should be negative.
To test H2b, we partition AC_EXP% into AFE_EXP% and NONAFE_EXP%. As in Hoitash et
al. (2009), we define accounting financial expertise as having previous experience as CPA, CFO,
principal financial officer, chief accounting officer, principal accounting officer, treasurer, auditor,
or vice president-finance. AFE_EXP% measures the percentage of AC financial experts that are
AFEs and NONAFE_EXP% measures the percentage of AC financial experts that have no previous
significant accounting experience. If H2b is correct, the coefficient on AFE_EXP% should be
negative. Because H2b does not address financial experts who are not AFEs, we make no prediction
for the coefficient on NONAFE_EXP%.
Finally, H3 predicts that dark periods will be shorter when the company’s ACC is an AFE. To
test this hypothesis, we define AC_EXP% with two binary variables—NONACC_AFE and
ACC_AFE—to partition the incremental AFE effects that may exist depending on the specific
accounting expertise of the ACC. In this specification, NONACC_AFE identifies companies that do
have an AFE on their AC, but the AFE is not the ACC. The second variable, ACC_AFE, identifies
companies that have an ACC who is an AFE. If H3 is correct, the coefficient for ACC_AFE should
be negative. We make no specific prediction for the coefficient on NONACC_AFE.
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample Selection
We identified our sample of dark restatements by first searching 8-K item 4.02 disclosures
entitled ‘‘Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financial Statements,’’ from 2004 to 2009, for variants
of the phrase ‘‘as soon as practicable.’’ These are the keywords that often are associated with dark
restatements. We then added the restatement observations used by Myers et al. (2011) that did not
provide quantitative details in their initial 8-K filings. Our initial sample of potential dark
restatements includes 512 observations. We examined each disclosure to ensure that specific
information regarding the quantitative impact of the restatement was not provided. We eliminated
286 observations that either (1) involved repeat disclosures; (2) were made prior to the effective
date of the four-day rule (August 23, 2004); or (3) provided specific information regarding the
quantitative impact of the restatement. We eliminated an additional 67 observations that did not
have sufficient data in either SEC filings or Compustat to be included in our multivariate models.
Finally, we removed five observations where restatement details were provided within three days of
the date on which the company discovered the need for a restatement. Our final sample consists of
154 firms, 131 of which provided no information at all about the quantitative impact of the
restatement in their initial filings and 23 of which only provided vague information.13 Of the 154
13 We discuss sensitivity tests involving these 23 companies later in the paper.
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firms announcing dark restatements between 2004 and 2009, the greatest concentration (137
observations) occurs during the 2005–2007 period. For the remaining 17 observations, four occur in
2004, ten occur in 2008, and three occur in 2009.14
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the different types of restatements occurring across our
sample of firms, as classified by Audit Analytics. We divide the restatement types into 12 separate
categories. Some of these categories span two or three Audit Analytics restatement codes and it is
also important to note that the incidents presented in Table 1 do not reflect unique firm
observations. For example, the 73 restatements that we categorize as ‘‘stock-based compensation/
options backdating’’ represent 43 unique firms that have restatements classified in Audit Analytics
categories #17 (deferred, stock-based, and/or executive compensation issues) and/or #48 (deferred,
stock-based options backdating only). There are a total of 419 restatement problems cited across our
154 sample firms, for an average of 2.72 per firm. The most common problems involve options and
stock-based compensation, mergers and consolidations, leases, long-term assets, and revenue and
expense recognition. The largest values of TIMEPASSED (greater than three months) correspond to
restatements related to options and stock-based compensation, revenue and expense recognition,
foreign/related party/affiliated/subsidiary issues, and receivables/investments/cash. The smallest
values of TIMEPASSED (less than two months) occur with restatements related to leases and long-
term assets.
Table 1 does not reveal many particularly noteworthy trends associated with Big 4 auditors. Big
4 firms audit approximately 90 percent of clients in two of the restatement categories that have the
longest dark periods and also in both of the restatement categories that have the shortest dark
periods. Big 4 representation among revenue recognition restatements is only 58 percent, however,
and is only around 50 percent for restatements related primarily to debt, inventory, and receivables.
We describe sensitivity tests related to modeling all of these categories later in the paper.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents selected descriptive statistics. All of the variables are defined in Appendix A
and all balance sheet and income statement data are taken from the annual filings preceding the date
on which the company discovered a need for restatement. The first variable in Table 2 is
FILINGDELAY, which measures the passage of time between the date on which the firm stated that
it discovered the need for a restatement (i.e., the date of management’s non-reliance judgment) and
the date of the 8-K filing providing this disclosure. The mean value of FILINGDELAY is 3.45
calendar days, and further investigation reveals that 94 percent of our companies filed their initial 8-
K within six calendar days. Therefore, a vast majority of dark restaters do seem to be in compliance
with the four (business)-day rule. However, Table 2 also shows that the average value for
TIMEPASSED across the 154 sample firms is approximately 92 days, with a median value of 52.50
days.15 Thus, a significant delay in the disclosure of the restatement’s quantitative impact on
earnings does exist for these firms.
Table 2 also reveals that firms having dark restatements tend to be relatively small, with a
median value of total assets (ASSETS) of $446 million. For purposes of comparison, the median
total assets reported by Myers et al. (2011) for their sample of companies restating between 2002
and 2008 is $503 million. Companies in our sample are not highly leveraged, as the mean
14 Twenty-nine percent of the surviving announcements occurred in the first quarter of the announcement year, 21
percent occurred in the second quarter, 21 percent occurred in the third quarter, and 29 percent occurred in the
fourth quarter.
15 For the seven companies that never disclosed restatement details, we set TIMEPASSED equal to 365 days. Only
two companies that did ultimately provide restatement details had a value of TIMEPASSED in excess of 365 days.
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proportion of long-term debt to total assets (LTDAR) is 0.18. Mean ROA is negative (0.08), but
median ROA is positive (0.01). The absolute value of the restatement’s effect on earnings
(RELATIVE_RESTATEMENT_EFFECT) is larger than that which has been documented in
comparable studies. For example, the median value of 1.4 percent of assets is higher than the
median of 0.8 percent found in Badertscher and Burks (2011).16 Because our firms tend to have
restatements that are more material than those of similar studies, it is reasonable to conclude that the
magnitude or materiality of a given restatement increases the likelihood that financial statement
users will be ‘‘left in the dark’’ for some period of time.
With regard to stock ownership, the mean values for the percentage of shares held by 5 percent
and greater outside blockholders (OUTSIDEBLK) and by all directors and officers as a group
(DIROFFSHR), are 26 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The average length of the restated time
period (LENGTH) is 3.26 years and 32 percent of our companies discovered the need for restatement
within 90 days after their fiscal year-end (DURING_AUDIT). Twenty-five percent of the dark
restatements were associated with disclosed fraud, irregularities, misrepresentations, or regulatory
investigations (FRAUD), 76 percent had problems across multiple restatement categories
(MULT_ISSUES), and 18 percent had restatement adjustments that ultimately increased earnings
(POS_EARN). With regard to auditors, 71 percent of companies had Big 4 auditors (BIG4) when the
restatement was announced, 23 percent of the auditors were industry specialists (AUD_SPEC), and
14 percent of companies had a change in auditor (AUDCHG) during the period beginning one year
before the revelation of a need for restatement and ending at the date on which details were provided.
TABLE 1
Distribution of Restatement Types
Category
Number
Incidents
Average
TIMEPASSED %BIG4
Stock-based compensation/Options backdating 73 115.70 0.88
Consolidations/Mergers and acquisitions 43 81.59 0.62
Lease/leasehold issues 40 40.55 0.91
Property, plant, and equipment/Intangibles 37 52.90 0.87
Revenue recognition 31 107.00 0.58
Expense recognition/Capitalization of expenditures 30 91.55 0.72
Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues 24 73.35 0.83
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants, and equity 22 87.50 0.45
Foreign, related party, affiliated, or subsidiary issues 20 115.50 0.92
Liabilities, payables, reserves, and accrual estimate failures 15 72.07 0.67
Inventory, vendor, and/or cost of sales issues 13 80.54 0.53
Accounts/loans receivable, investments, and cash issues 11 127.70 0.55
Other 60 97.47 0.60
Representation of Restatement Categories across the 154 Sample Firms 419
This table presents the number of incidents across all sample firms, not the number of unique sample firms affected by
each incident. For example, 43 unique sample firms are represented in the 73 incidents involving stock-based
compensation, and/or options backdating. However, the average TIMEPASSED values, and the %BIG4 values are
calculated based on unique firms (e.g., 43 firms for the stock-based compensation, and/or options backdating category)
such that multiple incidents within a restatement category per firm are not included more than once.
16 When we define RELATIVE_RESTATEMENT_EFFECT as the absolute value of the cumulative earnings effect
scaled by income, the median value is 28.4 percent.
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The remaining summary measures are related to AC characteristics. The median number of AC
members (AC_SIZE) for the firms in our sample is three, which is identical to that of Hoitash et al.
(2009). The average number of SOX Section 407 financial experts (AC_EXPERTS) per AC is 1.45 and
the average ratio of financial experts to AC size (AC_EXP%) is 43 percent, which is within the range
previously documented by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008). In our sample, this 43 percent is
distributed as 24 percent having accounting financial expertise (AFE_EXP%) and 19 percent having
financial expertise in either a supervisory or user capacity (NONAFE_EXP%). While our AFE
proportion is comparable to the 22 percent documented by Hoitash et al. (2009), our proportion for non-
accounting financial expertise is smaller than the 41 percent that they document for supervisory financial
expertise. It is possible that this discrepancy is due to the fact that our classification of accounting and
non-accounting financial experts is limited to AC members that specifically are designated by the
restating firms as financial experts, while the classification of Hoitash et al. (2009) extends to all AC
members. Finally, 60 percent of the companies in our sample have an ACC who is an AFE (ACC_AFE)
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Sample of 154 Dark Restatements
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median 25% 75%
FILINGDELAY 3.45 2 1 5
TIMEPASSED 92.36 52.50 24 114
ASSETS 7275.68 446.43 92.37 1043.78
NI 69.08 4.85 3.19 33.67
RESTATEMENT_EFFECT 33.96 3.52 18.41 0.49
RELATIVE_RESTATEMENT_EFFECT 0.12 0.014 0.004 0.06
ROA 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.06
LTDAR 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.30
OUTSIDEBLK 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.37
DIROFFSHR 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.30
LENGTH 3.26 2.75 1.50 4.25
DURING_AUDIT 0.32 0 0 1
FRAUD 0.25 0 0 1
MULT_ISSUES 0.76 1 0 1
POS_EARN 0.18 0 0 0
FOR_SEG 1.49 0 0 2
BUS_SEG 1.86 1 1 3
PROXIMITY 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.48
AUD_SPEC 0.23 0 0 1
AUDCHG 0.14 0 0 0
BIG4 0.71 1 0 1
AC_SIZE 3.34 3 3 4
AC_EXPERTS 1.45 1 1 2
AC_EXP% 0.43 0.33 0.33 0.50
AFE_EXPERTS 0.77 1 0 1
AFE_EXP% 0.24 0.25 0 0.33
NONAFE_EXP% 0.19 0 0 0.33
ACC_AFE 0.60 1 0 1
NONACC_AFE 0.09 0 0 0
(continued on next page)
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and only 9 percent of companies with AFEs have ACCs who are not AFEs (NONACC_AFE). Stated
differently, among our 154 sample firms, 48 (31 percent) do not have an AFE on their audit committee at
all, 92 (60 percent) have an ACC who is an AFE, and 14 (9 percent) only have non-ACC AFEs.
Panel B of Table 2 provides a frequency distribution that shows how AC expertise maps into
AC size. Panel B reveals that 132 of our 154 firms (86 percent) have either three or four members
on their ACs. Most of the committees (92) have three members, and the most common number of
Section 407 financial experts among three-member ACs is one. It is also interesting to note,
however, that among the 92 firms that have ACs with three members, 30 of these committees do not
have an AFE at all. Forty of our sample firms have four-member ACs, with 24 (27) of these having
one Section 407 financial expert (AFE). Across three- and four-member committees, 95 percent of
firms have at least one Section 407 financial expert and 59 percent have at least one AFE.
In Panel C of Table 2, we present mean TIMEPASSED values for all of the binary partitions
that can be made from our set of independent variables. Panel C shows that dark periods are
significantly longer when the restatements involve fraud and when there is an auditor change. Dark
TABLE 2 (continued)
Panel B: Distribution of AC Experts and AC Financial Experts
Number Firms AC_SIZE
Number AC Experts
(Number AC Accounting Financial Experts)
0 1 2 3 4 5
3 0 3 — — — — —
(3) — — — — —
6 2 — 5 1 — — —
— (6) (0) — — —
92 3 3 70 10 9 — —
(30) (54) (7) (1) — —
40 4 1 24 4 5 6 —
(11) (27) (2) (0) (0) —
11 5 0 6 2 1 — 2
(4) (7) (0) (0) — (0)
2 6 — — 1 1 — —
— — (2) (0) — —
154 Total 7 105 18 16 6 2
(48) (94) (11) (1) (0) (0)
Panel C: Mean TIMEPASSED Values for Selected Binary Partitions
Variable
Number Mean TIMEPASSED
t-statistic p-valueYes No Yes No
DURING_AUDIT 49 105 65.37 105.00 2.72 0.007
FRAUD 38 116 144.30 75.33 3.49 0.001
MULT_ISSUES 117 37 95.83 81.38 0.78 0.439
POS_EARN 27 127 47.81 101.80 4.28 0.001
AUD_SPEC 35 119 70.26 98.86 2.12 0.036
AUDCHG 21 133 137.60 85.22 2.29 0.023
BIG4 109 45 83.13 114.70 1.82 0.070
ACC_AFE 92 62 81.41 108.60 1.69 0.093
NONACC_AFE 14 140 98.50 91.74 0.19 0.855
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periods are significantly shorter when the need for restatement is discovered during the period that
presumably includes the year-end audit, when the restatement earnings adjustments are positive,
when an industry specialist or Big 4 auditor is involved, and when the ACC is an AFE. While all of
these relationships are consistent with our expectations, we defer further discussion to the section of
the paper that presents our multivariate analysis.
In Table 3, we present pairwise correlations for the variables that are included in our multivariate
models. Pearson correlations are above the diagonal, Spearman correlations are below the diagonal,
and significant (p , 0.10) correlations are shown in bold type. Table 3 reveals that large firms are
more likely to have higher ROA, more debt, less inside ownership, and longer restated time periods
(not longer dark periods). Large firms are also more likely to experience multiple restatement issues,
have more foreign and business segments, and use Big 4 and industry specialist auditors. Section 407
financial expertise on the AC is positively correlated with firm size as well, but the associations are
more with non-accounting expertise than with accounting financial expertise. Other interesting
pairwise associations relate to Big 4 auditors. In addition to being associated with larger clients, Big
4 auditors are engaged by clients that are more profitable and more highly leveraged, and that have
longer restated time periods (again, not longer dark periods). The restatements that are experienced
by clients of Big 4 auditors tend to be smaller in relative magnitude, however, and auditor changes
are significantly less likely among Big 4 clients. Finally, our ACC financial expertise measure is
positively correlated with positive earnings adjustments and negatively correlated with the number
of foreign segments, but is not correlated with any other variables that do not directly involve
financial expertise. Overall, significant correlations exist for a number of our variables of interest,
suggesting that a comprehensive multivariate analysis is warranted.
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Initial Tests
We present the results associated with our multivariate models in Table 4. Table 4 shows that
larger firms (logASSETS) have marginally longer dark periods, which is generally consistent with
the audit reporting lag findings of Ashton et al. (1987). We find no relationship between the length
of the dark period and the holdings of 5 percent and greater outside blockholders (OUTSIDEBLK),
but we do find that the greater the stock ownership of insiders (DIROFFSHR), the more quickly
firms provide restatement details (p , 0.01). Our finding regarding insider ownership complements
prior research suggesting that disclosure quality improves with more concentrated stock ownership
and/or greater monitoring (e.g., Bamber et al. 1993; Bushee and Noe 2000).
Regarding the timing of dark restatements, Table 4 shows that the longer the timespan between
the end of the restated time period and the discovery of the restatement (PROXIMITY), the longer
the dark period. Table 4 also shows that when restatements are discovered within three months after
the end of the firm’s fiscal year-end (DURING_AUDIT), dark periods are significantly shorter.
Taken together, these factors suggest that if restatements involve reporting periods that are
relatively recent and/or are discovered during the annual audit period, disclosures are significantly
timelier. Dark periods are significantly longer when fraud is involved (FRAUD)17 or when the
restatement magnitude is greater (RESTEFFECT),18 but are significantly shorter when the
17 As an additional sensitivity test, we classified as non-fraudulent (i.e., FRAUD¼ 0) the observations where there
were SEC or other regulatory investigations but no specific indication of financial fraud, irregularities, or
misrepresentations. The coefficient for FRAUD remains positive and highly significant in our multivariate models
and our conclusions regarding H1–H3 are unchanged.
18 The seven companies that never provided details are assigned to the middle (5th) RESTEFFECT decile. When we
assign these seven companies to random RESTEFFECT deciles, our results are qualitatively unchanged.
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adjustments have the effect of increasing earnings (POS_EARN). Finally, Table 4 shows that
disclosure timeliness suffers when there is an auditor change (AUDCHG) either immediately
preceding or during the dark period.19 Our findings, with respect to the control variables, generally
hold across all of the models that are presented in Table 4 and the negative binomial specification
appears to be equally appropriate across all models.20 As a result, the remainder of our discussion
will focus on the test variables.
H1 predicts that dark periods will be shorter for clients that are audited by Big 4 auditors. In all
three models, the coefficient for BIG4 is negative and statistically significant (p , 0.05). The
coefficient magnitudes are economically significant as well. In a negative binomial model, for a one
unit change in the independent variable, the difference in the logs of expected counts of the
dependent variable is expected to change by the value of the regression coefficient (i.e.,
TIMEPASSED is expected to change by exp^[coefficient] if all other variables are held constant).
Using the BIG4 coefficient of 0.38 in Model 1, a client with a Big 4 auditor would have a
predicted dark period that is only 68 percent as long (exp0.38¼ 0.68) as a client with a non-Big 4
auditor. Stated differently, the presence of a Big 4 auditor is associated with a dark period reduction
of 32 percent (1 exp0.38). At the average TIMEPASSED value of 92 days, this translates into a
restatement disclosure that is provided approximately one month faster when a Big 4 auditor is
present. Clearly, this is a nontrivial improvement in the timely provision of restatement details. It is
also important to note that our findings contrast with those of BB who predict, but do not document,
a negative coefficient for BIG4 in their sample of all restating companies. Our conclusion is that
limiting the analysis to restatements with observable disclosure lags allows us to identify the value
that Big 4 auditors may add to the restatement disclosure process.21
H2a predicts that dark periods will be shorter when there are more financial experts on the AC.
As indicated earlier, we use AC_EXP%, defined as the number of SOX Section 407 financial
experts on the AC divided by the total number of AC members, to test this hypothesis. The
coefficient for AC_EXP% is negative but insignificant in Model 1, suggesting that the presence of
relatively more Section 407 financial experts does not influence the length of restatement dark
periods.22Thus, our findings do not support H2a. However, when we partition AC_EXP% into the
percentage of members that are non-accounting financial experts (NONAFE_EXP%) and
accounting financial experts (AFE_EXP%), the coefficient for AFE_EXP% is negative and
significant (p , 0.03). This result supports H2b, and in combination with the non-result for both
AC_EXP% and NONAFE_EXP%, suggests that accounting expertise is particularly important in
reducing the length of restatement dark periods. The coefficient for AFE_EXP% implies a predicted
dark period reduction of 58 percent (1 exp0.87¼ 0.58) for a restatement firm having a committee
19 Our results are not sensitive to redefining the beginning auditor change date from one year prior to the discovery
date to 180 days or 90 days prior to the discovery date, nor are they sensitive to extending the ending auditor
change date to one year after the discovery date. Data limitations prevent us from reliably testing whether changes
across auditor classes (e.g., from non-Big 4 to Big 4) incrementally impact dark periods.
20 Scaled deviance and Pearson Chi-Square values that are close to 1 indicate appropriate fit for negative binomial
and Poisson models. These values are between 1.20 and 1.30 in the negative binomial models presented in Table
4, indicating adequate model fit. In contrast, values are between 50 and 60 when we estimate Poisson models.
When we estimate Poisson regressions with robust standard errors, the statistical significance of our test variables
improves slightly.
21 When we eliminate observations with TIMEPASSED values of 360 days or greater, the significance of BIG4
decreases to 8 percent and none of our other conclusions are changed. However, while only 29 percent of our
sample observations have non-Big 4 auditors, 78 percent of the observations with TIMEPASSED values of 360
days or greater have non-Big 4 auditors. Thus, one could make a reasonable argument that these observations are
not statistical ‘‘outliers,’’ but rather fundamental indicators that dark periods are, indeed, longer in the presence of
non-Big 4 auditors.
22 When we replace AC_EXP% with the number of audit committee experts (i.e., the raw number rather than the
number as a percentage of audit committee size), our results are qualitatively unchanged.
238 Schmidt and Wilkins
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
February 2013
comprised entirely of accounting financial experts, relative to a comparable firm having a
committee with no accounting financial experts. But, even if only one accounting financial expert
were present on a committee of three members, the predicted dark period would be reduced by 19
percent. This would represent an improvement in disclosure timeliness of two-and-a-half weeks at
the average TIMEPASSED value of 92 days.
Our final hypothesis suggests that companies that have ACCs with accounting financial
expertise should have shorter restatement dark periods. In Model 3, the coefficient for ACC_AFE is
negative and significant (p , 0.01) and the coefficient for NONACC_AFE is statistically
insignificant. The coefficient estimate of0.47 for ACC_AFE reveals that if all other variables are
held constant, a company with an ACC having significant accounting experience is predicted to
have a dark period that is 38 percent shorter than a similar company that does not have an AFE on
its audit committee (1 exp0.47¼ 0.38). This reduction results in a predicted dark period that is 35
days shorter when measured at the average TIMEPASSED value of 92 days. Overall, the results
presented in Table 4 provide support for H1, H2b, and H3.
Additional Tests
Table 3 shows that the Pearson correlation between AFE_EXP% and ACC_AFE is 0.74 (p ,
0.001), a level that obviously is very high. As a result, it is difficult to determine from the results
presented in Models 2 and 3 whether a higher proportion of AFEs or the presence of an ACC who is
also an AFE is more instrumental in reducing restatement dark periods. To explore this issue, we re-
estimated Model 2 and interacted ACC_AFE with both NONAFE_EXP% and AFE_EXP%. In this
model, the overall AFE effect appears to be driven primarily by the presence of ACCs who are
AFEs, as the only coefficient that is significant is the coefficient for ACC_AFE. We obtain similar
results when we estimate a fully interactive model that replaces AC_EXP% with a binary variable
that defines firms with audit committees having at least 50 percent SOX Section 407 financial
experts. In this interactive model, again, the only coefficient that is statistically significant is the
coefficient for ACC_AFE. Our conclusion is that the accounting expertise of the ACC is the most
important governance-related factor in our model.23
In constructing our sample, we attempted to retain only those restatements that were
sufficiently ‘‘dark’’ at the time of their disclosure. In all cases, we had to read the disclosures and in
most cases there was no judgment required at all. In other cases, we had to critically evaluate the
information provided in the 8-K and determine whether the company provided enough details to
require its removal from the sample. As noted previously, 23 of our companies did disclose some
restatement-related numbers in their initial 8-K filings; however, all of the disclosures included
enough uncertainty to be deemed sufficiently dark. For example, MatrixOne, Inc. notes in its 8-K
filing on August 3, 2005 that it ‘‘believes that less than $1.0 million of previously recognized
revenues will be reversed,’’ but that the restatement, ‘‘which is not yet complete and is subject to
audit by the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm, will also include other asset
and liability accounts that, in total, are expected to increase net income or reduce net loss [emphasis
added] in previously reported periods’’ (MatrixOne, Inc. 2005). Given the uncertainty implied by
the reversal of previously recognized revenues and the mysterious transactions that are expected to
influence earnings in the opposite direction, our opinion is that this filing did not shed much light on
the restatement details for MatrixOne. As a result, we did not remove MatrixOne nor the 22 other
‘‘judgment-call’’ firms from the sample. When we include an extra indicator variable in our
multivariate model that identifies these 23 firms, its coefficient is insignificant and our inferences
23 When we interact ACC_AFE with BIG4 and DIROFFSHR, all of the main effects are significant but the
interactions are not.
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regarding H1–H3 are unchanged. When we remove these 23 observations, our inferences are
unchanged as well. Our conclusion, therefore, is that providing vague information in an initial 8-K
disclosure does not ultimately influence the timeliness of meaningful restatement disclosures.
In the multivariate models presented in Table 4, we define RESTEFFECT as the decile ranking
of the absolute value of the restatement’s cumulative effect on earnings scaled by assets, because
the distribution of raw values includes some extreme observations. When we redefine
RESTEFFECT as the raw value rather than the decile ranking, the coefficient for RESTEFFECT
is positive but insignificant. However, when we winsorize the raw values at the top 5 percent, the
coefficient for RESTEFFECT is positive and significant (as it is in all of the Table 4 models) and
our results related to H1–H3 are unchanged. Therefore, our conclusion remains that restatements of
greater magnitude are associated with longer dark periods. Further, the mean absolute value of the
restatement’s effect on earnings scaled by total assets is approximately 12 percent, so these
restatements are economically significant and should be meaningful to investors.
Although our multivariate model is relatively comprehensive, we did include several additional
control measures to ensure—to the greatest extent possible—that our test variables are not simply
correlated with other potentially important factors. Specifically, we augmented our baseline model
with binary variables identifying (1) companies with material internal control weaknesses; (2)
companies with an above-median (specifically, eight) number of AC meetings;24 (3) companies
with missing prior year audit reporting lags or lags for which the data are over one year old;25 and
(4) the restatement categories identified in Table 1. Only two of these variables enter the model
significantly (binary measures identifying restatements related to plant assets and foreign/related
party/affiliate/subsidiary issues) and our inferences regarding H1–H3 remain unchanged.
As a final sensitivity test, we follow Myers et al. (2011) and analyze the length of the dark
period using a Cox proportional hazard model. The primary advantage of this model is that it
automatically adjusts for censored data and allows us to include the seven ‘‘permanently dark’’
companies in our analysis without having to set a specific TIMEPASSED value for them. Our
conclusions using this alternative model are consistent with the results presented in Table 4.
Limitations
The results of this study should be interpreted in light of at least two limitations. First, because
dark restatements are a relatively small subset of the overall population of accounting restatements,
our findings may not be as generalizable as those of other studies involving restatements. That
being said, we have done everything we can to ensure that our sample is comprised of a
comprehensive set of dark restatements. Second, within a given client, auditor choice and audit
committee design are endogenous. As such, it is possible that clients with ‘‘better’’ auditors and
audit committees may be more likely to have systems in place that allow them to address dark
restatement problems more quickly. Addressing this issue empirically is difficult given our sample
constraints, but we acknowledge that our results should be viewed with this caveat in mind.
24 We did not include the number of meetings in the model because those data are not available for 13 percent of our
sample observations. With our binary variable, we include the observations for which the number of meetings is
missing in the below-median category—an approach that seems reasonable given that these firms are smaller than
average and would not be likely to have more than eight AC meetings in a given year.
25 Our intent was to control specifically for the prior year’s audit reporting lag. However, for 16 percent of our
sample observations, data needed to calculate this measure are either missing or stale (i.e., the difference between
the 8-K announcing the restatement and the most recent 10-K filing date is greater than one year). These 16
percent of observations primarily include firms that did not file their 10-Ks on time and/or perpetually delayed
their filings.
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CONCLUSION
Companies that discover a need for a financial statement restatement are required to file an 8-K
within four business days of management’s non-reliance judgment, even if the precise impact of the
restatement on earnings is not yet known (SEC 2004). However, providing timely notification of a
non-reliance judgment is just one step in the disclosure process. It is also important that companies
provide timely disclosure of a restatement’s specific quantitative impact on earnings. In this study,
we investigate companies that delay their disclosure of restatement details following an initial 8-K
non-reliance disclosure. We refer to the period between these two dates as the restatement ‘‘dark
period.’’ Our objective is to determine whether auditor quality and audit committee financial
expertise are associated with improved restatement disclosure timeliness as reflected in reduced
restatement dark periods.
Using a sample of 154 dark restatements, we find that dark periods are shorter in the presence
of Big 4 auditors. We also find that restatement dark periods are shorter among clients that have
audit committees with more accounting financial experts. The relationship between audit committee
financial expertise and restatement dark periods is primarily attributable to the presence of an audit
committee chair who is an accounting financial expert. The dark period reduction is economically
significant, with restatement disclosures provided up to 38 percent faster for clients having Big 4
auditors and audit committee chairs with accounting financial expertise. Overall, our results suggest
that two important parties in the audit process—auditors and audit committees—can provide
significant value to clients as they attempt to bring their restatement darkness to light.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
FILINGDELAY number of days between the discovery of the need for a
restatement and the initial 8-K filing date;
TIMEPASSED number of days between the discovery of the need for a
restatement and disclosure of quantitative restatement details;
ASSETS total assets ($ millions);
NI net income ($ millions);
RESTATEMENT_EFFECT cumulative effect of restatement on earnings ($ millions);
RELATIVE_RESTATEMENT_EFFECT absolute value of RESTATEMENT_EFFECT/ASSETS;
RESTEFFECT decile ranking of RELATIVE_RESTATEMENT_EFFECT;
ROA NI/ASSETS;
LTDAR long-term debt/ASSETS;
OUTSIDEBLK percentage of stock held by 5 percent and greater outside
blockholders;
DIROFFSHR percentage of stock held by all directors and officers as a group;
LENGTH number of days in the restated time period/365;
DURING_AUDIT 1 if need for restatement discovered within 90 days after fiscal
year-end, 0 otherwise;
FRAUD 1 if restatement involved financial fraud, irregularities, or
misrepresentations, or the restating company was involved in
SEC or other regulatory investigations, 0 otherwise;
MULT_ISSUES 1 if the restatement involved more than one accounting rule
(GAAP/FASB) application failure, 0 otherwise;
POS_EARN 1 if the restatement increased earnings, 0 otherwise;
FOR_SEG number of foreign segments;
BUS_SEG number of business segments;
PROXIMITY (number of days between the end of the restated time period and
the discovery of the need for a restatement)/365;
AUD_SPEC 1 if the auditor at the discovery of the need for a restatement has
at least 30 percent national market share in the client’s
industry, 0 otherwise;
AUDCHG 1 if the client changed auditors from one year preceding the
discovery of the need for a restatement to the disclosure of
restatement details, 0 otherwise;
BIG4 1 if the auditor when the client discovered the need for a
restatement was a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise;
AC_SIZE number of members on audit committee;
AC_EXPERTS number of SOX Section 407 financial experts on audit committee;
AC_EXP% AC_EXPERTS/AC_SIZE;
AFE_EXPERTS number of accounting financial experts;
AFE_EXP% number of accounting financial experts/AC_SIZE;
NONAFE_EXP% number of non-accounting financial experts/AC_SIZE;
ACC_AFE 1 if audit committee chair is an accounting financial expert, 0
otherwise; and
NONACC_AFE 1 if company has an accounting financial expert but the
accounting financial expert is not the audit committee chair, 0
otherwise.
All financial variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end preceding the restatement announcement.
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